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Notes and Comments
Tim Quigley* A Shorn Beard**
I. Introduction
One of the prominent features of the common law is the concept of stare
decisis. As a mechanism to provide certainty and predictability in the
law, it is invaluable. Nonetheless, the doctrine of binding precedent,
essential though it is to the orderly development of the law, can be
misused. At times, the disingenuous application of stare decisis can lead
to severe distortion of the law from what was actually meant in the case
being cited as authority. Such, I submit, is the case with the intoxication
rules.
The law in Canada and England at present confines the defence of
intoxication to offences carrying what is called a "specific intent" and
refuses it for all other offences.' This article deals with the argument often
advanced that the intoxication rules are well-founded on case authority.
In particular, the specific-general intent dichotomy is often supported on
this ground. My submission is that this argument is, at best, based upon
a misunderstanding of the development of the intoxication defence and
the early cases in which that development took place. At worst, the
argument from authority relies upon misleading statements about those
early cases.
The cases that purport to derive the authority for the split between
specific and general intent from D.PP v. Beard2 are so numerous that it
would occupy much space merely to list them. I will, however, mention
a few of the better-known ones to illustrate that the argument that the
dichotomy is rooted in authority is a common one. Take D.PP v.
MajewskP as one example. The judgments, both at the Court of Appeal4
and the House of Lords5 levels, abound with references to the
entrenchment in the law of the concepts. So, too, does the Supreme Court
*Assistant Professor, College of Law, University of Saskatchewan.
**The author confesses that the play on words is derived from an earlier article by Alan D.
Gold, An Untrimmed "Beard' - The Law of Intoxication as a Defence to a Criminal Charge
(1976), 19 Crim. L.Q. 34.
1. This was made clear in England in D.D.P v. Majewski, [1976] 2 All E.R. 142 (H. L.) and,
in Canada, in Leary v. The Queen, [1978] 1 S.C.R.29 (S.C.C.).
2. D.PP v. Beard [1920] A.C. 479. (H.L.).
3. D.B v. Majewsk4 supra, note 1.
4. D.PP v. Majewski, [1975] 3 All E.R. 296 at 304,305,306. (C.A.).
5. Majewsk4 supra, note 1 at 147-50, 154-55, 156-59, 162-65, 169-70, 171-72.
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majority judgment in Leary v. The Queen.6 Similarly, the decisions in
McAskill v. The King, 7 Latour v. The King,8 R. v. George,9 A. G. for
Northern Ireland v. Gallagher,10 and Bratty v. A. G. for Northern
Ireland" all derive support for the distinction from Beard.
A reason often given for the specific-general intent dichotomy is that
it provided a way for judges to ameliorate the law's harshness while at the
same time maintaining some degree of protection for the public from
drunken and dangerous offenders. For instance, Lawton, L. J. in the
Court of Appeal in Maewski had this to say:
Counsel for the Crown pointed out that in the 19th century the judges
began to relax the strict common law rule in cases such as murder and
serious violent crime when the penalties were harsh (death or
transportation) or where there was likely to be much sympathy for the
accused (attempted suicide). Although there was much reforming zeal and
activity in the 19th century Parliament never once considered whether
self-induced intoxication should be a defence generally to a criminal
charge. It would have been a strange result if the merciful relaxation of a
strict rule of law had ended, without any Parliamentary intervention, by
whittling it away to such an extent that the more drunk a man became,
provided he stopped short of making himself insane, the better chance he
had of an acquittal. Counsel for the Crown submitted that when Beard's
case is considered against the 19th century development of the law... it
is clear what was being decided, namely the limits of the relaxation. 2
The above extract was quoted with approval by Lord Elwyn-Jones, L. C.
in the House of Lords 3 and referred to with approval by Lord Simon of
Glaisdale.14 Lord Salmon in Majewski also viewed the development of
the specific intent-basic intent dichotomy as a mitigation of the harshness
of the law' s and so did Lords Edmund-Davies and Russell.' 6
Interestingly, both the majority17 and the minority" in Leary accepted
that the impetus for the distinction was a desire to relax the severity of the
law. This view has also been expressed by several academic writers. 19
6. Leary v. The Queen, supra, note 1 at 50-53. (S.C.C.).
7. MacAskillv. TheKing, [1931] S.C.R. 330 (S.C.C.).
8. Latourv. TheKing, [1951] S.C.R. 19 at 29 (S.C.C.).
9. R. v. George, [1960] S.C.R. 871 at 878,891. (S.C.C.).
10. A.G.forNorthern Ireland v. Gallagher, [1963] A.C. 349 at 381. (H.L.).
11. Bratty v. A.G. forNorthern Ireland, [1963] A.C. 386 at 410. (H.L.).
12. Majewski, supra, note 4 at 305-06. The rule of law referred to by Lawton, L.J. is the
maxim that drunkenness is no excuse for crime.
13. Majewsk4 supra, note I at 147-48.
14. Id at 154.
15. Id at 156-57.
16. Id at 162, 163, 168, 169 and 171,
17. Leary, supra, note I at 53.
18. Id at 40, 41.
19. E.g.: N.L.A. Barlow, Drug Intoxication and the Principle of Capacitas Rationalis (1984),
100 L.Q.R. 639 at 640-41; Stanley M. Beck and Graham E. Parker, The Intoxicated Offender
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It is, of course, impossible to say whether judges in the nineteenth
century intended to mitigate the rigours of the law that then prevailed.
Accordingly, relaxation may have been among their motives in beginning
to permit some form of the intoxication defence. But it need not have
been the only Teason for so doing.
Specific and general intent have often been seen as techniques that
superseded the longstanding rule that drunkenness is no excuse for crime
yet did not leave the way completely clear for intoxicated offenders to
escape responsibility. It is equally plausible, however, that the rise of the
drunkenness defence parallels the development of the mental element in
crime. In other words, drunkenness began to be recognized as a defence
when mens rea became an accepted part of the law. Judges realized that
drunkenness to the extent of negating the mental element was
incompatible with mens rea. Later developments, including the whole
notion of specific intention and the misinterpretation of Beard, are based
upon misconceptions about mens rea and about the nature of the
intoxication defence.
II. Development of the Mental Element
In order to examine this position more closely, it is necessary to look
briefly at the history of the mental element in English law. At the outset,
I disclaim any pretence of providing a complete legal history; the
information set out here is derived entirely from secondary sources and
is not meant as a definitive history. I wish only to present background for
my statement that the present intoxication rules are based upon faulty
piemises insofay as they claim to, be founded upon authonty.
Nor do I pretend that the rise of mens rea is the only possible reason
for the acceptance of the intoxication defence. I acknowledge that there
may well have been a movement afoot amongst judges in the nineteenth
century to ameliorate the law's severity. I merely suggest another reason
the plausibility of which I hope to demonstrate.
Let us begin with the long-held view that drunkenness provides no
excuse for crime. This is an ethical and moral stance and if what is meant
by it is that impairment of faculties or lowering of inhibitions short of
- A Problem of Responsibility (1966), 44 Can. Bar Rev. 563; Jerome Hall, GeneralPrinciples
of Criminal Law (2nd. ed. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company Inc., 1960) at 529-557;
Jerome Hall, Intoxication and Criminal Responsibility (1944), 57 Harv. L. Rev. 1045; Jerome
Hall, Law, Social Science and Criminal Theory (Littleton, Colo.: Fred B. Rothman & Co.,
1982) at 226; Gerald Orchard, Drunkenness as a 'Defence"to Crime, [1977] 1 Crim. L. J. 59
at 61, 132. But, A.J. Ashworth, Reason, Logic and Criminal Liability (1975), 91 L.O.R. 102
at 113, believes, as I do, that development of the mental element led to recognition of the
intoxication defence and that twentieth-century judges have limited the defence, not their
nineteenth-century predecessors.
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negating the mental element is no excuse, it is unimpeachable. That is to
say, the mere fact of drinking to excess should have no bearing upon the
question of culpability.
This view, with some modifications, has been expressed throughout
English legal history. Indeed, essentially the same moral position was
presented by Aristotle.20 It was echoed by, among others, Coke,2' Hale,22
Hawkins23 and Blackstone,24 and in the cases of Reniger v. Fogossa5 and
Beverley's Case.26 The same principle has been upheld today, just one
example being R. v. Kamipeli.27 For so long as the mental element of
crime was non-existent or minimal, this proposition needed no
explanation.
However, it is important here to note the origins of the mental element
in English law. Going back to the time before the Norman conquest in
1066, it has been said that the law then required no mental element to
constitute guilt, save, perhaps, in the case of accidental harms.28 However,
rather than accepting that at face value, it is necessary to look at the
origins of the jury.
The jury in criminal cases dates from the thirteenth century.29 Before
that, it served as a body designed to obtain information in the manner of
an inquest3o and, as such, jurors acted as both witnesses and triers of the
facts.3' Therefore, it seems plausible to suggest that their knowledge of the
facts, whether personal or from gossip, affected their decision-making.
Thus, it is possible that even though a mental element was not required
20. Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, trans. R.W. Browne, (London: George Bell & Sons,
1889) at 67 in fact would have imposed double punishment for drunken offenders, once for
the offence and once for being intoxicated.
21. Vol. 2, Edward Coke, Commentary Upon Littleton eds. Francis Hargrave and Charles
Butler, (19th. ed. London: James & Luke G. Harsard & Sons, 1832) at 247a. Coke actually
wrote this in 1658-59. He agreed with the Aristotlian opinion that drunkenness aggravated
crime.
22. Vol. 1 Sir Matthew Hale, Pleas of the Crown, 1678, 32.
23. Vol. 1, William Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown (London: Professional Books Ltd., 1973) at
4. Hawkins first published his work in 1716.
24. Vol. 4, Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (London: Garland
Publishing Inc., 1978) at 25-26. This is a reprint of Blackstone's 9th ed. published in 1783.
25. Renigerv. Fogossa (1551), 75 E.R. 1 at 31.
26. Beverley's Case (1603), 76 E.R. 1118 at 1123.
27. R. v. Kamipeli, [1975] 2 N.Z.L.R. 610 at 614. (N.Z.C.A.), holding that drunkenness is
itself not a defence but going on to outline the relevance of intoxication to the determination
of the mental element.
28. Justice Owen Dixon, The Development of the Law of Homicide (1935), 9(supp.) A.L.J.
64 at 64-66; Francis Bowes Sayre, MensRea (1931/32), 45 Harv. L. Rev. 974 at 975-82.
29. Glanville Williams, The Proof of Guilt (3rd. ed. London: Stevens & Sons, 1963) at 4-5.
30. Vol. 1, Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England (London:
MacMillan & Co., 1883) at 425-26.
31. Id at 426; Williams, supra, note 29 at 5; D. O'Connor, The Transition from Inquisition
to Accusation (1984), 8 Crim. L.J. 351.
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to be proven, the jury would take into account that an act was
unintentional or accidental in arriving at its decision.
Be that as it may, both the role of the jury and the mental element
changed over time. In time, witnesses began to be called to give evidence
and the juroms assumed the, Yole of being only triers of fact. It neeye'rthetless
took several centuries for trial procedure to evolve to anything like its
present counterpart.
There were, at first, no rules of evidence as such32 and witnesses under
some circumstances gave depositions then introduced as evidence rather
than stating their evidence under oath in the presence of the accused.33
Moreover, the accused had no counsel,34 the defence could not call
witnesses35 and, perhaps most crucially, the accused could not testify in
her own cause.36 The process of change took from the thirteenth until the
late nineteenth century to be completed.
Meanwhile, the notion that the doing of the act alone would not suffice
to found guilt gained currency. This concept had slow and halting
beginnings. At first, accident and self-defence were accepted as
mitigating, though not exculpating, circumstances in cases of homicide.37
Self-defence now amounts to a justification. Accident, however, is now
seen as a negation of the mental element. In the thirteenth century, it was
seen instead as a situation where the actor was morally innocent. The
influence of the Church was predominant at this time in insisting that
blameworthiness of the offender was necessary for guilt.3 Thus, while
there was not generally a concept of a mental element in anything like
modern terms, it was being increasingly recognized that the doing of the
act alone was not sufficient for culpability.
Moreover, several offences, by their very nature, required a particular
intent. This was true of robbery and housebreaking for instance.39 Both of
these offences are done by design and cannot be committed through
mischance. 40 Thus, even in the absence of an established mental
32. Stephen, Id at 350.
33. Id at 349.
34. Id
35. Id at 350.
36. Id at 439, 440. Also: Ralph Slovenko, Psychiatry and the Law (Boston: Little, Brown &
Co., 1973) at 41. This was changed in England in 1898 by the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898,
617 162 Vict., c. 36, s. 1.
37. Dixon, supra, note 28 at 65; Sayre, supra, note 28 at 980-81. The offender received a
pardon rather than an acquittal.
38. Sayre, Id at 980, although Paul E. Raymond, The Origin and Rise of Moral Liability in
Anglo-Saxon Criminal Law (1936), 15 Ore. L. Rev. 93 at 117, claimed moral liability was
well-entrenched by 1100.
39. at 981.
40. Id at 989 and 1000.
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requirement, there could not be an offence of either type without there
having been some intent on the part of the accused.
In addition, there had already been, by the twelfth century, the
application of some concept of mens rea to perjury,4 1 apparently based
on a sermon given by St. Augustine who had come to England in the fifth
century A.D.42 It is difficult to say whether the Church's concept of the
mental element related more to moral guilt than to intention.
In any case, this era may have marked the beginnings of two separate
streams of thought about mens rea: moral guilt (or various offshoots of it)
and a particularized mental element for certain offences. Some
explanation of these is required.
The first is much more an examination of the moral character of the
accused without specific reference to the act itself. If the act was done and
if the actor behaved in a morally wrong way, culpability would lie.
In contrast, for the second type, while the nature of the act was
undeniably wrong in a moral, hence, criminal sense, the requirement of
a particularized mens rea meant only that the actor must have intended
(or, later, have been reckless) that the act occur. In other words, the
mental element was particular to the offence charged. The moral
character otherwise of the accused was irrelevant.
The latter approach was pursued by Bracton, writing in the thirteenth
century. He borrowed heavily from Roman law and, while sometimes
overstating the role of intention in English law, nevertheless contributed
to the development of the mental element. He stated:
... we must consider intention and purpose, as well as what is done or
said, in order to ascertain what action follows and what punishment.
For remove intention and every act will be indifferent; it is your intent
which distinguishes your acts, and a crime is not committed unless an
intention to injure exists; nor is theft committed without the intent to
steal.43
Yet, two centuries later, Chief Justice Brian said that
... it is common learning that the thought of a man will not be tried, for
even the devil does not know the thought of man.44
This illustrates the uneven development of the mental element.
Nonetheless, over the succeeding centuries, the mental element for
41. L.J. Downer, trans. & ed., Leges Henrici Primi (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972) at 94-95.
It was compiled about the year 1118. This may have been the first use of the maxim reum non
facit nisi mens sit rea.
42. Sayre, supra, note 28 at 983-84, note 30.
43. Vol. 2, Bracton, On the Laws and Customs of England, trans. Samuel E. Thorne,
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968) at 290.
44. Year Book Pasch. 17 Edw. IV, f.l, pl. 2 at f. 2 quoted in Peter Stein and John Shand, Legal
Values in Western Society (Edinbuirgb: University Press, 1974) at 133.
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particular offences became more defined. Animus furandi became the
mental element for theft;45 a felonious intent to commit a felony within
burgled premises was required for a burglary convictioi;46 arson required
a burning ex malitia praecogitata;47 and, finally, the malice aforethought
needed for a murder conviction slowly evolved with its extended and
artificial meanings.48
Likely because of the haphazard development of the mental element
and, perhaps, due to the two streams of thought about what constituted
mens rea, certain exceptions to culpability grew up as "defences" rather
than being seen as negations of the elements of the offence. Some of these
defences arose out of certain presumptions such as the presumption of
incapacity of an infant49 or the presumption of sanity.50
Others, such as mistake, took longer to be recognized as general
defences and, at first, were accepted on the basis that the actor was not
morally delinquent in a situation where a mistake was made. Later,
however, in Levett's Case,51 it was decided that a mistake negatived the
intention required to make the offence complete.
Throughout this period, which ran until the nineteenth century,
drunkenness continued to be denied as a defence. But, due to the way that
exceptions to culpability arose as affirmative defences, the way was
paved for it too to be seen in that light.
Meanwhile, the developments in the law of evidence and in criminal
procedure52 made it more possible for a court to determine the mental
element. Thus, the rise of the mental element and the changes in evidence
and procedure combined to set the stage for the acceptance of the
intoxication "defence". But, first, let us note what had happened to the
two schools of mens rea thought.
To do so requires a look ahead some years. The intoxication defence
began to be accepted from approximately 1819 onwards.53 It was much
later in the century that the two cases that represent each of the mens rea
concepts were decided.
45. Bracton, supra, note 43 at 425.
46. Vol. 3, Edward Coke, The Institutes of the Laws of England, eds. David S. Berkowitz and
Samuel E. Thorne, (London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1979) at 63.
47. Id at 67; Bracton supra, note 43 at 414.
49. Vol. 3, Stephen, supra, note 30 at 43, ascTihes fiint se o the term "malir af1teth1Dight"
to a decree of King Richard II in 1389: 13 Rich. II, St. II, c. 1. by the mid-sixteenth century,
its meaning had been extended to include, inter alia, felony murder.
49. Hale, supra, note 22 at 27-28.
50. Coke, supra, note 21 at 247a.
51. Levett's Case (1638), Cro. Car. 538. 1.
52. Supra, notes 32,33,34,35,36.
53. R. v. Grindley, infra, note 64 was the first known case to allow the defence.
174 The Dalhousie Law Journal
R. v. Prince,54 though confusing in that three majority judgments were
given, probably typifies the school of thought that saw mens rea as
connoting some form of moral guilt. In actual fact, the decision turned on
whether the offence in question required mens rea at all but, along the
way, the judges provided some insight into their views about mens rea.
Some equated it with moral wrongdoing,55 others with a legal, though
not necessarily criminal, wrong 6 while Brett, J., in dissent, thought it
meant a criminal mind.57 Whatever the precise definition, it is clear that
the judges in Prince saw mens rea in a moral light at least connoting
something broader than the mental element required for the particular
offence.
This view of mens rea was also espoused by some of the judges in R. v.
Tolson5s8 but the judgment which has been widely accepted ever since was
given by Stephen, J.59 Two passages of his judgment are particularly
instructive:
My view of the subject is based upon a particular application of the
doctrine usually, though I think not happily, described by the phrase "non
est reus, nisi mens sit rea." Though this phrase is in common use, I think
it most unfortunate, and not only likely to mislead, but actually
misleading, on the following grounds. It naturally suggests that, apart from
all particular definitions of crimes, such a thing exists as a "mens rea," or
"guilty mind," which is always expressly or by implication involved in
every definition. This is obviously not the case, for the mental elements of
different crimes differ widely. "Mens rea" means in the case of murder,
malice aforethought; in the case of theft, an intention to steal; in the case
of rape, an intention to have forcible connection with a woman without
her consent; and in the case of receiving stolen goods, knowledge that the
goods were stolen. In some cases it denotes mere inattention. For instance,
in the case of manslaughter by negligence it may mean forgetting to notice
a signal. It appears confusing to call so many dissimilar states of mind by
one name.. . . To an unlegal mind it suggests that by the law of England
no act is a crime which is done from laudable motives, in other words, that
immorality is essential to crime.60
Later on, he gave a definition for mens rea which is often referred to
today, as, for instance, in Majewski:6'
The principle involved appears to me, when fully considered, to amount
to no more than this. The full definition of every crime contains expressly
54. R. v. Prince, [1874-801All E.R. Rep. 881.
55. Id at 884, per Bramwell, B., with whom five others concurred.
56. Id at 896, per Denman, J.
57. Id at 891.
58. R. v. Tolson (1889), 23 Q.B.D. 168. (Crown Cases Reserved).
59. Id at 184-93.
60. Id at 185-86.
61. Majewsk4 supra, note 1 at 147, 150, 153, 161.
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or by implication a proposition as to a state of mind. Therefore, if the
mental element of any conduct alleged to be a crime is proved to have
been absent in any given case, the crime so defined is not committed; or,
again, if a crime if fully defined, nothing amounts to that crime which does
not satisfy that definition.62
It can at once be seen that the Prince view of mens rea would impose
liability for a much broader range of mental states than would the Tolson
view which restricts the concept to the particular mental state called for
by the offence in question.
Let me then turn back to the early cases dealing with intoxication to
examine which approach was being suggested by the judges. It must be
borne in mind, however, that neither the Prince nor Tolson approaches
had been expressly adopted prior to this. Authority lay on both sides, the
developed mental element for robbery, theft, arson, burglary and,
perhaps, murder on the Tolson side and such misdemeanours as trespass63
on the other, given the moral stand against the defence that had, to this
point, prevailed.
HII. The Early Intoxication Cases
The point I wish to make about the early intoxication cases is not that
they wholeheartedly adopted the Tolson position long before it was
decided nor even that they completely rejected the moral guilt view of
mens rea, but simply that they were moving in the direction of Tolson,
impelled perhaps by mitigatory impulses but just as surely by a growing
recognition that proof of the mental element was required and that it
varied from crime to crime. Evidence for this is found in the fact that
certain offences had already particularized the mental element: robbery,
theft, and burglary, for example.
Nonetheless, the moral strictures against intoxication prevented it
being considered on the question of intent until R. v. Grindley.64 By this
time, some important changes had taken place in evidence and procedure
which would facilitate the determination of the accused's actual mental
state. Among these, the permitting of defence witnesses, 65 expert opinion
evidence66 and a defence counsel67 were of great importance.
62. Tolson, supra, note 58 at 187.
63. Sayre, supra, note22 at MC 3.
64. R. v. Grindley, (Worcestershire Summer Assizes), 1819 (unreported), described in Vol. 1,
Sir William Russell and Charles Springel Greaves, A Treatise on Crimes and Misdemeanours
(4th. ed. Phila.: T. & J.W. Johnson & Co., 1877) at 12. [Hereinafter cited as Russell on
Crimes].
65. Permitted for treasons and felonies since 1702: 1702, 1 Anne 2, c. 9.
66. Folkes v. Chadd et aL (1782), 99 E.R. 589, first permitted expert opinion evidence.
67. Prisoners CounselAct, 1836,6 &7 Will. 4, c. 114.
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In addition, whatever the definition accorded mens rea, its place in
criminal law had been assured by Fowler v. Padget68 which, in 1798, held
that an act did not become a crime unless accompanied by a guilty intent:
actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea.69 This maxim, really stating two
principles, that of requiring mens rea and contemporaneity of the mens
rea and the actus reus, was so entrenched that Lord Kenyon cited no
authority for it.
The nineteenth century cases on intoxication are few in number and
the reports are scanty in detail. It is therefore difficult to draw any firm
conclusions about the thinking of the judges involved and the resulting
state of the law. Nevertheless, these cases can be summarized in the
following way:
1. Drunkenness could be taken into account in deciding, on a subjective
basis, whether an accused had been provoked.70
2. Although it was unclear whether the test was the capacity to form the
requisite intent or the actual intent, evidence of drunkenness could be
considered on the issue.71
3. Drunkenness could be considered on the question of whether an
accused thought she was being attacked.72
4. Intoxication could result in a disease of the mind, hence, legal
insanity. 73
5. There was nowhere an articulated theory of specific intent nor any
mention whatever in intoxication cases of general or basic intent.74
6. In only two cases75 was there any use of terminology similar to
specific intent, once being "specific" 76 and once "special". 77 Whether
these were meant as terms of art will be discussed shortly.
68. Fowlerv.Padget (1798), 101 E.R. 1103.
69. ld at 1106.
70. Grindley, supra, note 64; Pearson's Case (1835), 168 E.R. 1108; R. v. Thomas (1837),
173 E.R. 356, although contra is R v. Carroll (1835), 173 E.R. 64.
71. ?. v.Meakin (1836), 173 E.R. 131;R. v. Cruse (1838), 173 E.R. 610;R. v. Hayes (1846),
10 J.P. 470; R. v. Monkhouse (1849), 4 Cox C.C. 55; R. v. Bentley (1850), 14 J.P. 671; R. v.
Moore (1852), 175 E.R. 571; R. v. Doody (1854), 6 Cox C.C. 463; R. v. Stopford (1870),
11 Cox C.C. 643; R. v. Doherty (1887), 16 Cox C.C. 306.
72. Marshall's Case (1830), 168 E.R. 965; Goodier's Case, 1831 (unreported), but referred to
in Marshall; R. v. Gamlen (1858), 175 E.R. 639.
73. R. v.Davis(1881),14 Cox C.C. 563.
74. There can, of course, be no authority for a negative; suffice to say, I have searched long
and hard for any articulation of a theory. The only mention of "general" intent that I have
discovered is by Hall, 57 Harv. L. Rev., supra, note 18 at 1068, citing R. v. Pembliton (1874),
12 Cox C.C. 607. The reference is, however, to "general" intent to break the law, i.e.
"transferred" intent and, in fact, the case nowhere mentions general intent as such.
75. Monkhouse and Doherty, supra, note 70.
76. Monkhouse, Id. at 56.
77. Doherty, supra, note 71 at 308.
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The earliest of these cases, Grindley, Pearson's Case78 and Thomas,79
dealt with provocation. Although provocation, a defence only to murder,
is not seen as a negation of mens rea, it is nevertheless bound up with the
mental processes of the accused, albeit the volitive rather than the
cognitive processes. In that sense, the consideration of intoxication on the
question of provocation in these early cases might be seen as a precursor
of its being considered on the question of the mental element. And, in
fact, that very thing happened. Meakin80 was apparently the first case
which did so. In a case of stabbing with intent to murder, Alderson, B.
directed the jury that
... with regard to the intention, drunkenness may perhaps be adverted to
according to the nature of the instrument used. If a man uses a stick, you
would not infer a malicious intent so strongly against him, if drunk, when
he made an intemperate use of it, as you would if he had used a different
kind of weapon; but where a dangerous instrument is used, which, if used,
must produce grievous bodily harm, drunkenness can have no effeUt on
the consideration of the malicious intent of the party.8'
This passage does not state any particular rule of law but is, instead, a
common sense statement as a guide to determining whether the requisite
mental state was present. It is revealing that there was no mention of
specific intent nor of any restriction of the intoxication defence.
In Cruse,82 a charge of inflicting injury with intent to murder, the trial
judge told the jury:
It appears that both these persons were drunk, and although drunkenness
is no excuse for any crime whatever, yet it is often of very great
importance in cases where it is a question of intention. A person may be
so drunk as to be utterly unable to form any intention at all, and yet he
may be guilty of very great violence. If you are not satisfied that the
prisoners, or either of them, had formed a positive intention of murdering
this child you may still find them guilty of an assault.83
At first blush, this might appear as if the trial judge was restricting the
intoxication defence by charging on the included offence of assault.
However, I would submit otherwise for two reasons. First, the use of the
word "may" indicates that he was not completely ruling out acquittal
even for assault. Second, the included offence, assault,84 could be found
78. Pearson, supra, note 70.
79. Thomas, supra, note 70.
80. Meaki4 supra, note 71.
81. Id at 132.
82. Cruse, supra, note 71.
83. Idat 612.
84. An Act to amend the Laws relating to Offences against the Person, 1837, 1 Vict., c. 85,
s. 11 made assault an included offence.
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on ordinary subjective mens rea principles without regard to any specific-
general intent distinction since there was no evidence that the male
accused was unaware of what he was doing when he hit the child.
The first case to use the term "specific intention" was Monkhouse.85
The accused had discharged a loaded pistol at the complainant and was
charged with offences of varying intents, including the intent to murder,
the intent to maim and disable and the intent to do grievous bodily harm.
Coleridge, J. directed the jury as follows:
Drunkenness is ordinarily neither a defence nor excuse for crime, and
where it is available as apartial answer to a charge, it rests on the prisoner
to prove it, and it is not enough that he was excited or rendered more
irritable, unless the intoxication was such as to prevent his restraining
himself from committing the act in question, or to take away from him the
power of forming any specific intention.
... You must not find him guilty of one of these intents on mere guess,
but, on the other hand, I am bound to tell you that if you think one or all
of them existed, there is evidence sufficient, in point of law, to justify you
in saying So.O6 [emphases mine]
Again, the emphasized portions might indicate a movement towards
the present law. There is nothing, however, to indicate that "specific
intention" was used in any way other than as meaning "particular
intention".8 7
The reference to "partial answer" likewise might be seen as indicating
the present dichotomy. However, the offences charged all carried with
them what is now known as an ulterior intent, for which today's law
would allow the intoxication defence in each case. On today's law, there
would nevertheless be a conviction for assault as an included basic intent
offence. The same offence, assault, was included in Monkhouse by virtue
of legislation.88 Yet, the trial judge did not direct the jury to consider that
offence which he surely would have had he in mind restricting the
defence as a matter of law. Justice Coleridge may simply have meant that
no issue of outright acquittal arose on the facts since, on ordinary
subjective principles, there was no indication that the accused lacked the
state of mind required for a common assault conviction.
Doherty8 9 was the other case that arguably made reference to a
particular kind of intent, in that case "special intent". The charge was one
of murder by shooting where the accused conducted a conversaton with
85. Monkhouse, supra, note 71 at 56.
86. Id
87. This was also the opinion of Justice Dickson in dissent in Leary, supra, note 1 at 37.
88. Supra, note 84, s. 11. The charge of discharging a firearm with intent to murder is defined
in s. 3 of the same Act and s. 11 applies to it.
89. Doherty, supra, note 71.
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the deceased after the shooting which would seemingly have ruled out his
having been in an automatous state. This is an important point to bear in
mind for it might explain why no issue of outright acquittal arose in the
case9". The trial judge, the eminent Stephen, J., whose judgment in
Tolson demonstrates his views on mens rea, said:
But it is difficult to see how a man can fire a loaded pistol at another
without intending to do him grievous bodily harm, so that if you think that
Doherty fired the pistol at the deceased's body, intending to hit him, but
taking his chance where he hit him, that would be murder, though he did
not intend to kill. If, on the other hand, you think that he fired it vaguely,
without any special intent at all, and by so doing caused his death, that
would be manslaughter.... but, although you cannot take drunkenness as
any excuse for crime, yet when the crime is such that the intention of the
party committing it is one of its constituent elements, you may look at the
fact that a man was in drink in considering whether he formed the
intention necessary to constitute the crime.91
It is important to note that Stephen, J. went on to put both
manslaughter by violence wilfully inflicted and manslaughter by
negligence to the jury. Thus, it would seem that, in the case of violence
wilfully inflicted, he considered that there was still some type of mental
element involved, such as at least an intent to fire the pistol, though
without the intents required for murder. Otherwise, had he considered
manslaughter to be a basic intent offence for which drunkenness was of
no avail, he would not have bothered to put manslaughter by negligence
to the jury at all.
It is entirely possible that Doherty represents the beginning of the
doctrine that intoxication negating intent could only reduce murder to
manslaughter, not lead to acquittal, but it is striking that Stephen, J.
nowhere states that proposition. It is plausible that subsequent cases
misinterpreted what he said in Doherty in that regard.
Moreover, even if he did mean to lay down such a proposition, it does
not necessarily follow that he meant that intoxication, in all
circumstances, could be a defence only for specific intent offences. His
use of the word "special" surely cannot be seen as connoting any
particular significance; juxtaposed as it was by the adverb "vaguely", it
meant merely that the accused lacked the particular intent for murder
when he fired the pistol.
What may have led to the murder-manslaughter rule was the mental
element for each of those crimes. In the case of murder, its mental
element, malice aforethought, had acquired an artifical legal meaning
which included not only a positive intention to kill but also the intention
90. Orchard, supra, note 19 at 63, also points this out.
91. Doherty, supra, note 71 at 308.
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to cause greivous bodily harm knowing that it likely would cause death.92
Every culpable homicide that was not murder was manslaughter which
therefore covered many situations.
Among these were culpable negligence, whether or not death or bodily
harm was intended, and accidental death caused by an unlawful act 3 On
those definitions, it can be seen that an intoxicated offender could be
convicted of manslaughter even where she completely lacked intent.
These definitions, particularly that of negligence, undoubtedly led
Stephen, J. in Doherty to particularize the types of manslaughter that the
jury should consider.
That he also put manslaughter wilfully inflicted to the jury indicates
the wide scope of manslaughter. That particular species of manslaughter
obviously contains, unlike the others, a mental element even though not
so precisely defined as the malice aforethought for murder. The
references to "special" intent and firing "vaguely" give some clue as to
this mental element.
Rather than indicating a rigid rule, such as Lipman94 and Hartridge95
impose today, whereby intoxication negativing the mental element for
murder automatically gives rise to liability for manslaughter, it is
apparent that Stephen, J. wanted the jury to consider the gradations of
the lesser offence. It is clear that he felt that some intent to fire the pistol
was involved in the more serious type of manslaughter. But is equally
clear that he did not mean that this intent was a different species of mens
rea altogether. As I earlier stated, no issue of outright acquittal on
account of automatism arose on the facts, hence, the case is not authority
for the proposition later expounded in Lipman and Hartridge.
There is later authority from Stephen himself that he envisioned a
mental element for the type of manslaughter categorized in Doherty as
violence wilfully inflicted. Some years later, he stated:
As the law now stands, if a man stabs another with intent to do him
grievous bodily harm, and in fact kills him, he is guilty of murder. If he
intentionally strikes him a blow with his fist or with a small stick with no
intention to inflict any great harm, and happens to kill him, he is guilty of
manslaughter.96
To summarize the views of Stephen, he saw mens rea as a misleading
term, the mental element for crime varying with the crime. His judgment
in Doherty was consistent with this view and with his view of the law that
92. 1 am leaving aside the other definitions - the felony murder principle and the resisting of
lawful arrest principle - as set out by Stephen, J. See: Vol. 3, Stephen, supra, note 30 at 22.
93. M at 20.
94. R v. Lipman, [1970] 1 Q.B. 152. (C.A.).
95. R. v. Hartridge, [1967] 1 C.C.C. 346. (Sask. C.A.).
96. Vol. 3, Stephen, supra, note 30 at 56.
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manslaughter was a catch-all for homicides falling short of murder. In
this view, there were types of manslaughter for which negligence
provided the culpability but there were other types. Even for negligent
manslaughter, he nowhere articulated the opinion that it was necessarily
a lesser offence for which an offender was liable when intoxication
negatived the mental element for murder. His reference to "special"
intent is scant authority upon which to rest the notion of specific intent.
The rule that intoxication could reduce murder to manslaughter may
have arisen from his statements in Doherty but, even there, such a
principle has weak legal underpinnings indeed.
Nonetheless, it is true that later cases began to insert the adjective
"specific" when dealing with intent and it is also the case that the murder-
manslaughter rule became an accepted one. The latter was, for instance,
applied in R. v. Meade97 which quoted Doherty as authority.
Interestingly, Meade, while purporting to lay down a wide statement of
the law of intoxication, did not try to do so by reference to the specific
intent doctrine.
The situation, therefore, on the eve of Beard was that there was by no
means an articulated theory of the intoxication defence. All that was
clearly established was that a special rule had evolved whereby
intoxication to the point of negating malice aforethought would reduce
murder to manslaughter. The limitations of even that rule were based on
tenuous analysis and meagre authority.
The submission has here been made that judges in the nineteenth
century began to realize the requirement for mens rea and that it varied
from crime to crime. Rather than limiting the intoxication defence to
certain types of offences, they began to see that it must be taken into
account in determining the mental element no matter the offence.
The only possible exceptions for mens rea offences were murder and
manslaughter. If it was intended as a limitation of the intoxication
defence, it arose for understandable reasons: almost anyone would recoil
at the thought of a drunken killer going scot-free and Parliament had not
provided any alternative. In those circumstanes, it is not at all surprising
that such an exception might have arisen.
It is plausible that no case of drunken automatism arose for
consideration during that period. Therefore, there was likely no
opportunity and no need to devise any rule akin to that now established
by Lipman and Hartridge whereby a homicidal act, even without volition
or any mens rea whatsoever, gives rise to liabiliy for manslaughter.
Certainly Doherty was not such a case. Indeed, that situation is quite rare
97. R. v. Meade, [1909] 1 K.B. 895. (C.A.).
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even today with the greater use of a wider variety of intoxicants; there
must surely have been few such cases in those days and courts were
hampered in their determination of mental states by the inability of the
accused to testify and by the infant state of psychiatric knowledge. It may
well be, therefore, that those few cases that seemed to devise the murder-
manslaughter rule instead merely applied ordinary principles of criminal
law in determining the state of mind required for the actual offence. In
the case of manslaughter, "states of mind" included, but was not limited
to, negligence.
I stated at the outset that, at the least, mitigation of the law's harshness
was not the only possible reason for the rise of the intoxication defence.
The foregoing discussion has attempted to show that the advent of the
defence could be instead (or equally) predicated upon the notion of mens
rea.
There is one final point insofar as mitigation of sentence is concerned.
It is this: it was quite unnecessary for judges to devise some means of
mitigating the penalties provided by the law because, throughout the
same period that the intoxication defence was evolving, Parliament was
acting to reduce the ambit of capital punishment and transportation.98
It would thus be strange if judges acted at this particular time in legal
history to diminish the severity of the law when they had at no earlier
time invented any similar doctrine to abate punishment and at a time
when Parliament was meeting these concerns through legislative action.
Surely this lends credence to the view that the intoxication defence arose
more because judges realized the need for mens rea than because of
mitigatory influences.
Indeed, as the cases subsequent to Beard will show, far from nineteenth
century judges seeking to mitigate the stiff penalties of the day, it has been
twentieth century judges who have sought to narrow the scope of the
intoxication defence99 and, in doing so, have done the precise opposite to
what is alleged to have been the motivation behind the rise of the defence
in the last century.
IV D.PP v. Beard
BeardanO is, of course, considered the origin of the specific-general intent
99. Capital punishment was the automatic punishment for felony until welt into the nineteenth
century even though judges enjoyed some discretion to recommend clemency and
transportation: D.A. Thomas, Principles of Sentencing (2nd. ed. London: Heinemann, 1979)
at 6. Gradually, and especially between 1827 and 1840 and again in 1861, the scope of capital
punishment was reduced and imprisonment began replacing transportation. Nonetheless, there
may still have been a mitigatory impulse in relation to murder, for which capital punishment
remained, hence, possibly the murder-manslaughter anomaly.
99. Ashworth, supra, note 19 at 113 makes this point.
100. Beard supra, note 2.
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dichotomy. Whether that is a warranted interpretation of the case is very
doubtful indeed. Nevertheless, the orthodox interpretation is so
entrenched that there is very strong resistance to considering it in any
other light. I shall try to demonstrate that the view of Beard accepted in
our law is quite wrong and, at times, an apparent refusal to accept what
was actually said.
Let me begin the discussion with the question of whether Lord
Birkenhead, L. C. espoused the Tolson or the Prince view of mens rea.
Neither case is cited in Beard but I suggest that Lord Birkenhead, by
inference, adopted the Tolson approach.
Lord Birkenhead began his judgment with a recital of the facts and
with a history of the intoxication cases. That he had unfeigned respect for
Stephen, J. is apparent by his description of him as "[t]his eminent
authority on criminal law"' 10 and by the extensive references to
judgments of Justice Stephen, Doherty being the most important. He
concluded his review of the cases by saying:
... these decisions establish that where a specific intent is an essential
element in the offence, evidence of a state of drunkenness rendering the
accused incapable of forming such an intent should be taken into
consideration in order to determine whether he had in fact formed the
intent necessary to constitute the particular crime. If he was so drunk that
he was incapable of forming the intent required he could not be convicted
of a crime which was committed only if the intent was proved. This does
not mean that the drunkenness in itself is an excuse for the crime but that
the state of drunkenness may be incompatible with the actual crime
charged and may therefore negative the commision of that crime.102
[emphases mine]
It is important to note the striking similarity between the second
emphasized portion and the view of mens rea espoused by Stephen, J. in
Tolson. 03 It might not convince one that Lord Birkenhead was
embracing this concept of the mental element but it is persuasive in the
sense that it ties intoxication to the question of the mental element for the
particular crime.
The mention of the word "specific" no doubt weakens this argument
if it can be construed as connoting a particular species of intent. But I
submit that it was not intended in that way at all. Consider the last
portion of the same paragraph:
In a charge of murder based upon intention to kill or to do grievous bodily
harm, if the jury are satisfied that the accused was, by reason of his
drunken condition, incapable of forming the intent to kill or to do grievous
101. Id at498.
102. 1d at499.
103. Tolson, supra, note 58 at 187.
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bodily harm, unlawful homicide with malice aforethought is not
established and he cannot be convicted of murder. But nevertheless
unlawful homicide has been committed by the accused, and consequently
he is guilty of unlawful homicide without malice aforethought, and that is
manslaughter: per Stephen, J. in Doherty's Case (1) This reasoning may
be sound or unsound- but whether the principle be truly expressed in this
view, or whether its origin is traceable to that older view of the law held by
some civilians (as expressed by Hale) that, in truth, it may be that the cause
of the punishment is the drunkenness which has led to the crime, rather
than the crime itsel; the law is plain beyond all question that in cases
falling short of insanity a condition of drunkenness at the time of
committing an offence causing death can only, when it is available at all
have the effect of reducing the crime from murder to manslaughter.'°4
[emphasis mine]
The emphasized extract demonstrates that Lord Birkenhead accepted
that murder could only be reduced to manslaughter but was unsure upon
what basis this could be justified.
It seems that he misconstrued Doherty in that he did not state that there
was a mental element for manslaughter at all. This, in turn, caused him
to find the murder-manslaughter rule an anomaly for which he cited two
possible explanations. Had he considered Justice Stephen's other writings
about manslaughter, he might well have posited a subjective mental
element for certain types of manslaughter and/or done away with the
anomaly altogether. In any event, it is evident that the rule bothered him
as being an exceptional one not consistent with his own thoughts on mens
rea. Had he meant specific intent as a way of limiting the intoxication
defence, he surely would have said so and, one would have thought,
attempted to define it. But he did not.
If he intended any special meaning for the term, I suggest that it merely
meant particularized intent, whether in a statute, such as the intent to
wound, or in case law, such as malice aforethought for murder, as
opposed to the mental element for those offences whose mental element
was implied or had not been articulated in statute or case law. Even then,
he did not seek to differentiate between the two types of intent by
allowing the intoxication defence for one but not the other for, if he
intended to so, he certainly might have stated so explicitly. Instead, he
stated later on in the judgment, in an oft-quoted passage:
In Meade's Case the crime charged was that death arose from violence
done with intent to cause grievous bodily harm. In this case the death
arose from a violent act done in furtherance of what was in itself a felony
of violence. In Meade's Case, therefore, it was essential to prove the
specific intent; in Beard's case it was only necessary to prove that the
104. Beard supra, note 2 at 500.
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violent act causing death was done in furtherance of the felony of rape. I
do not think that the proposition of law deduced from these earlier cases
is an exceptional rule applicable only to cases in which it is necessary to
prove a specific intent in order to constitute the graver crime - e.g.,
wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm or with intent to kill. It
is true that in such cases the specific intent must be proved to constitute the
particular crime, but this is, on ultimate analysis, only in accordance with
the ordinary law applicable to crime, for, speaking generally (and apart
from certain special offences), a person cannot be convicted of a crime
unless the mens was rea 05 [emphasis mine]
A literal reading of this passage would seem to confirm that Lord
Birkenhead intended no restriction of the intoxication defence. However,
the passage was interpreted in Majewski'06 as meaning that intoxication
might be a defence to any specific intent offence even where there is no
lesser included general or basic intent office. There are several things
wrong with the interpretation given by Lord Russell in Majewski.
In the first place, he cited MooreY°' an attempted suicide case, as an
example of a specific intent offence for which there was no lesser offence.
The clear implication would seem to be that all attempts are specific
intent offences. This opinion has been reiterated by certain academic
writers but there is now case authority going the other way' 08 and
certainly there was no such case decided up to the time of Beard. It seems
just as likely that Lord Birkenhead, like Jervis, C. J. in Moore, considered
it patently obvious that a person ".... so drunk as not to know what she
was about"'10 9 could not intend to commit suicide, in other words, a
straightforward negation of the mental element.
More important, Lord Russell provided no explanation whatever for
the italicized sentence. The clause, ". . . a person cannot be convicted of
a crime unless the mens was rea" must certainly mean what it says. Lord
105. 1d at 504.
106. Majewski, supra, note 1 at 172, per Lord Russell.
107. Moore, supra, note 71.
108. J.C. Smith and Brian Hogan, Criminal Law (5th. ed. London: Butterworths, 1983) at
197, and Eric Colvin, A Theory of the Intoxication Defence (1981), 59 Can. Bar Rev. 750 at
757, both state that all attempts are specific intent without citing case authority. In fact, there
are several cases, though none explicitly on the point at either the Supreme Court of Canada
or House of Lords level, which suggest that attempts follow the completed offence: 1. v.
Boucher, [1963] 2 C.C.C. 241 (B.C.C.A.), approved in Leary, supra, note I at 56; P. v. Bartlett
(1993), 5 C.C.C. (3d) 321 at 336. Ont. 1-.C.); R. v. Trifler (19K,), 55 C.C.C. (2d) 411. (B.C.
Co. Ct.); R. v. Revelle (1979), 48 C.C.C. (2d) 267 (Ont. C.A.). In addition, R. v. Pigg, [1982]
2 All E.R. 591. (C.A.), although not an intoxication case, discusses recklessness as a mental
element for attempted rape. By the combined operation of MajewskiandR. v. Caldvell, [1981]
1 All E.R. 961. (H.L.), all offences having recklessness as a mental element are basic intent
offences for the purposes of the intoxication rules. Therefore, on this reasoning, Pigg might be
taken as deciding that attempted rape is a basic intent offence, the same as the full offence, rape.
109. Moore, supra, note 71 at 571.
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Russell and those judges who have adopted his interpretation 10 have
consistently glossed over this portion without even attempting to explain
it.
That sentence is an important clue to Lord Birkenhead's thinking on
the mental element of crime. If he meant the term specific intent in any
technical way at all, it was merely to illustrate the mental element for
those offences for which Parliament had set out an express intent or for
which case law had articulated a precise intent. But it is also clear that he
did not see specific intent as a different kind of mens rea, as the italicized
sentence indicates. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that he
adhered to the Tolson view of mens rea. In other words, if Lord Russell's
interpretation of this passage is wrong, the literal interpretation is the only
plausible alternative.
If this is so, the quoted portion and the following passages assume a
different character altogether from how they usually have been
interpreted. This is what was said subsequent to the previous quote:
... drunkenness in this case could be no defence unless it could be
established that Beard at the time of committing the rape was so drunk
that he was incapable of forming the intent to commit it, which was not
in fact, and manifestly, having regard to the evidence, could not be
contended. .. . The capacity of the mind of the prisoner to form the
felonious intent which murder involves is in other words to be explored in
relation to the ravishment; and not in relation merely to the violent acts
which gave effect to the ravishment."'
If Lord Birkenhead was a follower of the Tolson school, all this meant
was that, where felony murder was charged, the requisite intent was the
intent to commit the underlying felony. This was consistent with the
malice aforethought that had developed for felony murder 12 and did not
require the gyrations that Lord Russell went through to overcome the
specific-general intent dichotomy in cases where the underlying offence is
one of general intent.
Indeed, the reference to Meade clearly contradicts Lord Russell's
statement" 3 that Beard is authority for the proposition that murder is
always a crime of specific intent. Lord Birkenhead in fact said that the
specific intent to kill or do grievous bodily harm had to be proven in
Meade but not in Beard. Nonetheless, he would have permitted the
110. All the other Law Lords in Majewski and the majority in Leary, supra, note 1.
I 11. Beard supra, note 2 at 504-05. He reiterated this at 507.
112. Vol. 3, Stephen, supra, note 30 at 22.
113. Majewski supra, note 1 at 172. Swietlinski v. The Queen (1980), 55 C.C.C. (2d) 481
(S.C.C.), especially at 495, followed this reasoning. Both cases would allow the intoxication
defence for any charge of murder including constructive or felony murder where the
underlying offence was of general intent. Murder is thus always a crime of specific intent.
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intoxication defence in Beard had the evidence shown a lack of intent to
commit the underlying felony. Far from indicating that murder is always
a crime of specific intent, he expressly said that felony murder was not,
thus showing that he did not at all mean the term "specific" in a precise
technical way.
Though later cases have wrestled to get around the plain words used
by Lord Birkenhead, it is noteworthy that at least one commentator,
writing immediately after Beard, accepted that what was said was meant.
He simply disagreed with it. This was Stroud, who stated:
The whole of these observations ... suggest an extension of the defence of
drunkenness far beyong the limits which have hitherto been assigned to it.
The suggestion, put shortly, is that drunkenness may be available as a
defence, upon any criminal charge, whenever it can be shown to have
affected mens rea. Not only is there no authority for this suggestion: there
is abundant authority, both ancient and modern, to the contrary."4
(emphasis minel
The emphasized sentence is, in fact, a gross misrepresentation of the
existing law to that point for, as I have endeavoured to point out, judges
in the nineteenth century did not articulate any restriction upon the
intoxication defence, other than possibly in the case of murder. The
reason that Stroud took such exception to the plain meaning of the
passage in Beard was because of his own view of mens rea. In an earlier
book, Mens Rea,"5 he had criticized the definition given the term by
Stephen, J. in Tolson"t6 by saying:
Instead of saying that mens rea means, in the case of murder, malice
aforethought, in the case of theft and intention to steal, and so forth, it
would have been more correct to say that it includes those states of mind
respectively, as being comprised in a general intention to break the laws
which prohibit the criminal acts in question." 7
This view assumes crucial importance in subsequent interpretations of
Beard for Stroud was quoted with approval by the House of Lords in
Majewski.18 .
Notwithstanding that several of the Lords in Majewski explicitly
quoted from Tolson," 9 they, at the same time, adopted the other view of
mens rea exemplified by Prince o20 and Stroud. It is a concept of mens rea
quite incompatible with Tolson mens rea and, if I am right in asserting
114. D.A. Stroud, Constructive Murder andDrunkenness (1920), 36 L.Q.R. 268 at 270.
115. Stroud, MensRea (London: Sweet & Maxwell, Ltd., 1914).
116. Tolson, supra, note 58 at 185-86.
117. Stroud, MensRea, supra, note 115 at 15.
118. Majewski supra, note I at 149,150,151,164,169,170.
119. Id at 146,147,150,153,160,161.
120. Prince, supra, note 54.
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that Lord Birkenhead was an adherent of the latter school, with what was
said in Beard.
Under this concept, mens rea is supplied by a general intention to
break the law and can include a general form of recklessness, of which
the act of getting inebriated can be considered an example:
By allowing himself to get drunk, and thereby putting himself in such a
condition as to be no longer amenable to the law's commands, a man
shows such regardlessness as amounts to mens rea for the purpose of all
ordinary crimes.. 121
Obviously the above statement is not in accord with the statement by
Lord Birkenhead that:
It is true that in such cases the specific intent must be proved to constitute
the particular crime, but this is, on ultimate analyais, only in accordance
with the ordinary law applicable to crime, for, speaking generally,... a
person cannot be convicted of a crime unless the mens was rea. 22
It can thus be seen that the judgment in Beard is far more in line with a
particularized concept of mens rea and that, flowing out of that approach
to the mental element, it did not seek to split intent into specific and other
kinds of intent.
Further evidence for this opinion lies in the fact that there was
nowhere any mention of a counterpart to specific intent. In addition,
there was no attempt made to define specific intent or mens rea, a further
indication that no restriction of the intoxication defence was intended.
Given the stress that has since been placed upon Lord Birkenhead's use
of the adjective "specific", it is noteworthy that he used it only seven
times 123 in the judgment. The first time was in a quote from
Monkhouse'24 and was some eight pages into the judgment; it obviously
was not meant as a term of art there. Of the remaining six, once was in
a context already canvassed as pertaining to the particularity of the
mental element of crime, 25 rather than as having any distinctive legal
meaning.
It was also mentioned twice in the three rules that he set out in relation
121. Stroud, supra, note 114 at 273. Stroud's view of mens rea was echoed by, inter alia: R.U.
Singh, History of the Defence of Drunkenness in English Criminal Law (1933), 49 L.Q.R. 528
at 544-45; Constructive Murder- Drunkenness in Relation to Mens Rea (1920-21), 34 Harv.
L. Rev. 78 at 80; John E. Stannard, The demise of drunkenness (1982), 2 L.S. 291 at 298;
Courtney Stanhope Kenny, Outlines of Criminal Law (1st. ed. reprint. Cambridge: University
Press, 1904) especially at 59-61.
122. Beard, supra, note 2 at 504.
123. Id. at 498,499,500, 501, and three times at 504.
124. Monkhouse, supra, note 71, at 56, quoted inBeard Id at 498.
125. Beard, Id at 499.
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to intoxication. 26 The first of these counterposed incapacity to form a
specific intention with insanity caused by intoxication'27 and was meant
to distinguish the situation where an accused was rendered incapable of
knowing the nature and quality of the act or of knowing it was wrong
(insanity) from the situation where the mental element was lacking due
to intoxication. The second was in rule two 128 and again related to the
term to the mental element "essential to constitute the crime.. ,129
rather than as indicating a distinctive species of intent. This is confirmed
by the last three instances of its use, all of which arose in connection with
the passage he finished by stating that "a person cannot be convicted of
a crime unless the mens was rea."'130
There has been considerable support, both judicial and academic in
favour of the interpretation I am seeking to place upon Beard. On the
judicial front, Justice Dickson in Leary131 expressed doubt about the
conventional meaning. In Kamipeli,3 2 the New Zealand Court of Appeal
did likewise and went on to state:
The use of this adjective [specific] has of recent years been often criticised
as suggesting the existence of a distinction between the Crown's burden in
those cases when the general intent involved in proof of mens rea is
necessary, on the one hand, and in those when the statute prescribes a
particular intent on the other. But we cannot accept that Lord Birkenhead
intended any such distinction. ... So whether it be a general or a
particular intent the burden is the same; the Crown must prove the intent
required by the crime alleged. 33
The Court elsewhere went on to point out that the relevance of
evidence of intoxication was to shed doubt on proof of the mental
element and not to say that raising the defence exempted the Crown from
its ordinary duty to prove all the elements of the offence. 134
The High Court of Australia, in R. v. O'Connor,135 rejected the
application of Majewski to Australia and, in so doing, some of the judges
disagreed with the orthodox interpretations of Beard. For example, Chief
Justice Barwick interpreted the passage in Beard containing the phrase
126. Id at 500, 501.
127. Id at 500.
128. Id at 501.
129. Id
130. Id. at534.
131. Leary, supra, note 1 at 40.
132. Kamipel, supra, note 27.
133. Id at 614. Admittedly, the same Court, constituted differently, explicitly left open the
question of whether Majewski would be applied in New Zealand: R. v. Roulston, [1976] 2
N.Z.L.R. 644 (N.Z.C.A.).
134. Id at 616.
135. R. v. O'Connor(1980), 29 A.L.R. 449. (Aust. H.C.).
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". . a person cannot be convicted of a crime unless the mens was rea"136
in literal fashion. 37 In support of his opinion, he gave four reasons:
... first, that what was being decided was not by reason of an exceptional
rule; second, that it was in line with fundamental principle, ie of the
indispensable need for mens tea; third, the reference to 1. v. Moore (1852)
3 Car & K 319, and, lastly, the reference to a quotation from Meade's
case.
138
The last reason referred to a quotation in Beard from Meade139 which,
even though Lord Birkenhead disapproved of some of the language used,
nonetheless indicated an understanding that the relevance of intoxication
was in connection with the general requirement of proof of the mental
element. It must be remembered that Meade at no time made reference
to any distinction between specific and any other kind of intent.
In addition, Chief Justice Barwick,140 Justice Stephen,141 and Justice
Aickin' 42 all expressly adopted the approach advocated in Kamipeli,
namely, a literal interpretation of Beard so as to allow the intoxication
"defence" in any case where it led to doubt that the mental element was
proven.
On the academic front, several commentators have taken the same
view of Beard. In addition to those already mentioned,143 several of the
more accepted text writers in Canada and England have disagreed with
the prevailing opinion that Beard meant to lay down the specific-general
intent dichotomy. Among these are Smith and Hogan,' 44 Glanville
Williams, 4s Don Stuart,146 and Mewett and Manning. 47
There have also been several articles written disputing the present view
136. Beard supra, note 2 at 504.
137. O'Connor, supra, note 135 at 463.
138. Id
139. Meade, supra, note 97 at 899-900, quoted in Beard supra, note 2 at 503.
140. O'Connor, supra, note 108 at 464.
141. at 478.
142. Idat492.
143. Stroud, supra, note 114; Singh, supra, note 121; Constructive Murder - Drunkenness
in Relation to MensRea supra, note 121; Stannard, supra, note 121; Ashworth, supra, note 19,
Beck and Parker, supra, note 19; Orchard, supra, note 19.
144. Smith and Hogan, supra, note 108, 1st. ed., 1965 at 118. They repeated this view in the
3rd. ed., 1973 at 153 but, in the face of Majewski and Lipman, have backed off this position
somewhat in the 4th. ed., 1978 at 186, and 5th. ed., 1983 at 192.
145. Glanville Williams, Criminal Law The General Part (2nd. ed. London: Stevens & Sons
Limited, 1961) at 570; Glanville Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law (2nd. ed. London:
Stevens & Sons Limited, 1983) at 471.
146. Don Stuart, Canadian Criminal Law (Toronto: The Carswell Company Limited, 1982)
at 358-59.
147. Alan W. Mewett and Morris Manning, Criminal Law (2nd. ed. Toronto: Butterworths,
1985) at 207.
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of Beard.148 Surely the fact that respected academic writers have
consistently read Beard in such a way as to negate any suggestion of the
dichotomy demonstrates that this interpretation has cogency. If that be
the case, it would seem a valid criticism to accuse those adopting the
conventional view of the case of using stare decisis as a way of limiting
the intoxication defence but by dubious means.
In conclusion, my submission is that Beard has been badly
misinterpreted, in some cases by those wishing to find in it support for
their own views of mens rea and, in other cases, despite their own views.
The foregoing discussion has attempted to show that Lord Birkenhead
was an adherent of the Tolson school of mens rea, that he therefore
realized that intoxication to the point of negativing cognition was
incompatible with this theory of mens rea and that accordingly he meant
nothing in particular by the phrase "specific intent".
It must, however, be acknowledged that the judgment was not
consistently a model of clarity and it is not therefore surprising that there
have been conflicting opinions as to its meaning. Having conceded that
there has been room for confusion does not, however, mean a concession
that Beard represents sufficient authority for the specific and general or
basic intent distinction. It must be remembered that these latter terms
were never once used in the case and, consequently, the distinction was
not drawn until after Beard
V. Whence GeneralAnd Basic Intent?
As neither general or basic intent was mentioned in Beard, the question
naturally arises as to their origins. It should first be noted that the terms
are synonymous, the first being the term in general use in Canada and the
latter being its English counterpart. Both are in contradistinction to
specific intent and each has particular relevance to the intoxication
defence. But from whence did they come?
I previously pointed out that the nineteenth century intoxication cases
were few in number and scanty in detail. An examination of those cases
reveals no instance whatever of the use of these terms. Indeed, the earliest
example that I have been able to locate is in a work by Hall, 149 in which
he suggested that the antecedents of general intent lay with the doctrine
of transferred intent, a doctrine different altogether from the specific-
general intent dichotomy.
148. S.H. Bemer, The Defense of Drunkenness - A Reconsideration (1971), 6 U.B.C. L.
Rev. 309 at 331; Alan D. Gold, An Untrimmed "Beard" - The Law of Intoxication as a
Defence to a Criminal Charge (1976), 19 Crim. L. Q. 34; Paul B. Schabas, Intoxication and
Culpability: Towards an Offence of Criminal Intoxication (1984), 42 U. of T. Fac. L. Rev. 147.
149. Hall, 57 Harv. L. Rev., supra, note 19 at 1068. See also: note 74.
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It is difficult in legal research to prove a negative. Thus, a search for the
origins of these termns can prove both exasperating and fruitless. As near
as I can determine, t50 therefore, the first use of the term "general intent"
in a case was in R. v. George' 5' while the first use of "basic intent" did
not occur until D. P P v. Morgan.152 Neither cites any authority or source
for the terminology. A search through the leading texts was as rewarding:
until after Majewski was decided, there appears to have been no mention
whatever of either term.153 It is true that many of these same text writers
used the term "specific intent" but this was often done by way of direct
quotes from Beard with no comment or amplification. 54
One plausible explanation for its eventual appearance in the cases and
in texts is simply that it was thought necessary to have a counterpart to
specific intent.l55 The origins for this may have been the othei, view of
mens rea exemplified in the writings of Stroud 156 and Kenny 5 7 and by
R. v. Prince.l5 8
In this view, specific intent did apparently mean something over and
above "ordinary mens rea", hence, "ordinary mens rea" could be
considered a rough form of general or basic intent. Thus, while mens rea
meant simply a general intention to break the law, specific intent referred
to an additional intent stipulated by the legislature or through case law.
Sometimes it could be an intent ulterior to the actus reus, as for burglary,
or merely an extended or artificial intent, as for the malice aforethought
which constituted the mental element for murder.
150. Of the many intoxication cases I have considered that have been decided since Grindley,
supra, note 64, until George, supra, note 9, 1 found no mention of either general or basic intent.
I have confined the search to Canada, England and selected Commonwealth countries. If,
however, the terms were borrowed from other countries, such as, for example, from the United
States, one would expect the cases using the terms to have said so. They do not. It would
appear from Hall's discussion, supra, note 19 and from Wayne R. LaFave and Austin Scott,
Jr., Handbook in Criminal Law (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1972) at 343-44, that the
United States has used general intent as a term for a longer period of time than either Canada
or England.
151. George, supra, note 9.
152. D.RR v. Morgan, [1975] 2 All E.R. 347. (H.L.).
153. Inter alia, I have looked at: Smith and Hogan, supra, note 108, all editions (They first
use the term "basic intent" in the 4th. ed., 1978); Williams, Textbook, supra, note 144, both
editions; Williams, Criminal Law The General Part, supra, note 144, 2nd. ed.; Rupert Cross
and Philip Asterley Jones, An Introduction to Criminal Law (6th. ed. London: Butterworths,
1968); and, 8th. ed., 1976; Russell on Crimes, supra, note 64, 4th. ed., 1877; 8th. ed., 1923;
10th. ed., 1950; 1 1th. ed., 1958; 12th. ed., 1964; Kenny, Outlines of CriminalLaw, supra, note
121, Ist ed. reprint, 1904; 7th. ed., 1915; 9th. ed., 1918; 15th. ed., 1936; (J.W. Cecil Turner,
ed.) 16th. ed., 1952; 17th. ed., 1958; 19th. ed., 1966.
154. Among them were: Cross and Jones, Id Russell on Crimes, Id; and Kenny, Id
155. Hall, Law, Social Science and Criminal Theory, supra, note 19 at 226, suggests this.
156. Stroud, supra, notes 114 and 115.
157. Kenny, supra, note 122.
158. Prince, supra, note 54.
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Unfortunately, the judgments in George did not articulate such a
definition for general intent 59 nor did Lord Simon's judgment in
Morgan.60 The position, therefore, is that both terms have rather murky
and imprecise origins.
Indeed, while George may have seen the first use of the terminology,
it is not entirely clear that the Supreme Court meant to exclude the
intoxication defence for all general intent crimes. Justice Fauteux and
Justice Ritchie may both have meant only that it was difficult to conceive
of a case where a person applied the force constituting an assault but
lacked the intent to so apply force. Both Justices seemed to think that,
where an accused lacked such intent, the condition must necessarily be so
severe as to approximate insanity. Justice Fauteux said this:
Hence, the question is whether, owing to drunkenness, respondent's
condition was such that he was incapable of applying force intentionally.
I do not know that, short of a degree of drunkenness creating a condition
tantamount to insanity, such a situation could be metaphysically
conceived in an assault of the kind here involved. It is certain that, on the
facts found by the trial Judge, this situation did not exist in this case.'6'
Justice Ritchie said much the same:
The decision of the learned trial judge, in my opinion, constitutes a finding
that the respondent violently manhandled a man and knew that he was
hitting him. Under these circumstances, evidence that the accused was in
a state of voluntary drunkenness cannot be treated as a defence to a charge
of common assault because there is no suggestion that the drink which had
been consumed had produced permanent or temporary insanity and the
respondent's own statement indicates that he knew that he was applying
force to the person of a-aother 62
These passages indicate a reluctance to permit the intoxication defence
for a general intent offence but not an unqualified refusal to do so.
Nonetheless, these extracts have been glossed over and the dichotomy
became an accepted one. It took, however, until Majewski and its
acceptance in Canada in Leary for the specific-general intent distinction
to become legitimized.
159. Justice Fauteux in George, supra, note 9 at 877, and Justice Ritchie, at 890, both
appeared to give specific intent a purposive definition and define general intent as the intent to
do the immediate act. It is not clear whether their respective definitions are different from each
other but they certainly seem to be at odds with Stroud's view of mens rea.
160. Lord Simon likewise did not adopt the Stroud, Kenny and Pr'nce theory of mens rea.
Instead, his definition of basic intent is more like that of Justice Fauteux in George. In fact, he
later praised that definition in his judgment in Majewsk supra, note 1 at 154.
161. George, supra, note 9 at 879.
162. md. at 891.
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VI. Conclusion
At the outset, I pointed out that one of the arguments often made in
favour of the specific intent restriction on the intoxication defence was
that it rested upon entrenched authority, especially upon Beard. From the
argument presented here, it can be seen that the nineteenth century cases
do not provide sufficient authority upon which to found the restriction.
In the first place, they seldom mentioned specific intent and then not
in any technical way. The most that can be said is that the rule allowing
intoxication to negative the mental element for murder but leading to a
conviction for manslaughter had its genesis in this period. Whether that
rule was intended at all is a moot point.
Although mitigation of the law's severity may have been one of the
reasons for the gradual acceptance of the intoxication defence in the last
century, it was not the only reason. A more persuasive reason is that
judges began to realize the incompatibility of a mens rea requirement
with a denial of intoxication as a defence where the accused lacked the
requisite mens rea.
Beard itself is generally relied upon for legitimizing the specific-general
intent division. Yet, the whole tenor of Lord Birkenhead's judgment
pointed in the direction of the concept of mens rea typified by the
judgment of Justice Stephen in Tolson, namely, that the mental element
of any offence is particular to that offence. All intents are specific in this
view. Thus, while the judgment in Beard is a perplexing one, on balance
it is more consistent with the view that no such division was intended.
I have also sought to demonstrate that it has been twentieth century
judges and academic writers who have invented general and basic intent
as a way of limiting the intoxication defence.
If this is so, it is apparent that those who wish to defend the existing
law of Canada and England will have to marshall arguments other than
that from authority. In short, there is little actual authority for the present
law. None used both terms until George and none clearly and
unmistakeably sanctioned the specific-general intent dichotomy until
Majewski. The concepts of specific and general (or basic) intent must
therefore stand or fall on their own merits. A discussion of the merits of
those other arguments must, however, be postponed for another ariticle.
